Why does stopping MEV still require trusting a committee not to peek?
機会
Every production encrypted mempool protects pending transactions behind a threshold decryption committee. If enough members collude they can reconstruct keys and front-run the same transactions the protocol was built to hide. Unlike a consensus fork, early decryption by a corrupt committee leaves no on-chain evidence and cannot be slashed or even detected. A 2026 SoK paper systematising the entire field confirms this trust assumption persists across every deployed scheme. The only published alternative, DecryptChain, replaces the committee with proof-of-work, but introduces new latency tradeoffs and has not shipped on any production chain.
重要な理由
Until mempool encryption eliminates the trusted committee entirely, encrypted mempools shift MEV from open searchers to whoever controls the keys, which is a smaller and harder-to-audit set of actors.
機会をどう評価するか
Opportunity Scoreは測定値ではなく、私自身の見解です。どれほど痛みを伴うか、どれほど頻繁に影響を与えるか、そして今日時点で解決策がいかに少ないか。スコアが高いほど、構築する価値が高いと私は考えています。
それが現れたときにどれほどの痛みをもたらすか。
実際にどれほど頻繁に人々がそれに直面するか。
今日時点で、それに対する優れたツールがいかに少ないか。