Internet & Online Safety Β· Cuba
Online safety & content laws in Cuba (2026)
Cuba shaded by its internet & online safety status
Online safety rules in Cuba: heavy restriction.
FrameworkDecree Law 35 on Telecommunications/ICT (2021); Law 162/2023 on Social Communication (in force October 2024); Decree 370; ETECSA state monopoly on connectivity
Cuba operates a heavily state-controlled internet infrastructure where a single state-run provider (ETECSA) monopolises connectivity and is legally required to block users publishing content deemed contrary to socialist order or public morality. The 2021 Decree Law 35 and the 2024 Social Communication Law together criminalise online dissent, mandate content censorship without judicial oversight, and provide for government-accredited 'social communication inspectors' who monitor cyberspace. Freedom House rated Cuba 21/100 ('Not Free') in its Freedom on the Net 2025 report, one of the lowest scores globally.
Key points
Enacted in August 2021 after mass protests, Decree Law 35 obliges telecommunications providers to interrupt, suspend, or terminate service for users who publish content deemed 'fake', offensive to 'public morality', contrary to 'constitutional, social and economic precepts of the State', or inciting public disorder, with no requirement for judicial authorisation. Companion Resolutions 105, 107, and 108 govern cybersecurity and network use.
Law 162/2023 was published in Official Gazette No. 48 on 5 June 2024 and entered into force on 4 October 2024. It regulates media, community, and cyberspace spheres and contains vague content restrictions applicable to online speech. By November 2024 the government had accredited 'social communication inspectors' empowered to monitor and enforce compliance online.
ETECSA is Cuba's sole mobile telecommunications provider, fully state-owned, and serves as the primary enforcement mechanism for internet censorship. In May 2025 ETECSA imposed unprecedented caps on ordinary data plans (360 CUP per 30-day period, barely sufficient for a 6 GB package) at prices far exceeding the monthly minimum wage, further restricting practical access.
Authorities have repeatedly ordered ETECSA to block social media platforms and messaging apps during periods of civil unrest. The Freedom on the Net 2025 report noted that while major platforms were not wholesale-blocked during the 2024-25 coverage period (a marginal improvement), independent news websites remain systematically blocked, and some messaging apps showed signs of intermittent blocking.
Decree Law 35 and Decree 370 are routinely used to prosecute online expression. In January 2025, FΓ©lix Daniel PΓ©rez Ruiz was sentenced to five years imprisonment for a Facebook post criticising the government and calling for a public demonstration. The government also banned the import of unregistered satellite-linked devices and seized many such devices in March 2025.
Cuba has no framework analogous to the EU Digital Services Act or UK Online Safety Act. There is no independent regulator, no user rights-based content-moderation regime, and no formal age-verification framework; instead, all content obligations flow downward from the Communist Party-aligned state to the monopoly ISP, with no avenue for platform challenge or user appeal.
Timeline - major decisions & events
FΓ©lix Daniel PΓ©rez Ruiz was sentenced to five years in prison for a Facebook post criticizing the government and calling for a public demonstration. The case exemplifies routine enforcement of Cuba's layered online-speech laws against ordinary social media users.
Freedom House β Freedom on the Net 2025 βCuba's comprehensive Penal Code, adopted by the National Assembly in May 2022 and published in the Official Gazette in September 2022, came into force in December 2022. It explicitly criminalizes cybercrime offences such as 'dissemination of fake news' and 'propaganda against the constitutional order,' classifies social media use as an aggravating circumstance, and sets sentences of up to 15 years for online political speech.
Amnesty International βCuba enacted Law 149/2022 on Personal Data Protection, establishing a formal framework for the collection and processing of citizens' personal data under Article 97 of the Constitution. Enforced by the Ministry of Justice, the law entered into operational effect on 21 February 2023 β though critics note that state security agencies are expressly exempted from its protections.
Cuba Si (Cuban state media) βPublished in the Official Gazette just weeks after the mass July protests, Decree-Law 35 on Telecommunications, ICT and the Radio Spectrum β paired with Resolutions 105, 107, and 108 β criminalizes sharing 'false' or 'offensive' information online and grants authorities explicit power to suspend internet and telecom services. Human Rights Watch described it as a direct legislative crackdown triggered by the protest wave.
CUBADIPLOMATICA β Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs βFollowing the outbreak of mass protests on 11 July 2021, state telecom ETECSA blocked WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and YouTube from 12β18 July, confirmed by NetBlocks. Over one million Cubans turned to circumvention tools such as Psiphon; the shutdown drew global condemnation and directly prompted the subsequent Decree-Law 35 legislative response.
NetBlocks βDecree-Law 370 entered into force on 4 July 2019, prohibiting dissemination of information 'contrary to social interest, morals, good manners and integrity of people' on public networks, and barring Cubans from hosting sites on foreign servers. It became the primary instrument used to fine, detain, and confiscate equipment from independent journalists and bloggers, with at least 20 people fined and 7 imprisoned for social media posts by 2020.
ARTICLE 19 βState telecom ETECSA began rolling out 3G mobile internet to ordinary Cubans on 6 December 2018, for the first time giving citizens device-based internet access outside state-controlled kiosks. The launch transformed online organizing and independent journalism, but all connectivity remained routed through the state monopoly β enabling both access and surveillance.
Freedom House β Freedom on the Net 2019 βETECSA inaugurated 118 Nauta-branded public internet access centers on 4 June 2013, providing the first broadly available (though monitored and costly) public internet access for ordinary Cubans. Users were required to register with their national identity card, embedding state surveillance into the infrastructure from the outset.
Wikipedia β Internet in Cuba (citing ETECSA/state sources) βDecree-Law 209, enacted in 1996 concurrent with Cuba's first internet connection, prohibited internet use that violated 'Cuban society's moral principles, national security, or public order,' and authorized fines or service termination for non-compliance. It established the legal precedent of state-controlled, content-restricted internet access that all subsequent legislation has built upon.
Wikipedia β Internet Censorship in Cuba βCuba - other topics
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