Internet & Online Safety · Belarus
Online safety & content laws in Belarus (2026)
Belarus shaded by its internet & online safety status
Online safety rules in Belarus: heavy restriction, under Law on Mass Media (2008, as amended 2021+); Law on Counteracting Extremism; Operations and Analytical Center (OAC) under the President; Ministry of Information blocking authority; Government Resolution No. 476 (September 2025); Criminal Procedure Code amendments (February 2025).
Belarus operates one of the most restrictive internet regimes in Europe, characterised by pervasive state censorship rather than a rights-protective online-safety framework. The Operations and Analytical Center (OAC) and Ministry of Information can block websites without a court order, and authorities routinely impose total or partial internet shutdowns during politically sensitive events. Criminal liability attaches to sharing, reposting, or even 'liking' content designated as extremist, with sentences of up to seven or more years in prison.
Key points
By February 2025 the Ministry of Information had restricted access to more than 15,000 websites; nearly 7,000 were classified as 'extremist.' In 2024 alone, over 3,150 'destructive' internet resources were blocked, and the National List of Extremist Materials grew by roughly 2,000 entries that year.
During the January 2025 presidential election the OAC ordered ISPs to block all websites hosted outside the .by domain from 25-27 January, effectively cutting off the majority of the foreign internet. VPN services including Proton VPN and NordVPN were simultaneously throttled or blocked.
Government Resolution No. 476 of 2 September 2025, underpinned by February 2025 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code, authorises authorities to disconnect individual subscribers from telephone and internet services without any judicial proceeding. It entered into force on 5 September 2025.
Belarusian law criminalises accessing, sharing, reposting, or commenting on content by entities designated 'extremist' or 'terrorist.' Ordinary users have received sentences of over a year in prison for social-media activity; journalists sentenced in absentia have received ten-year terms. The designation also bars all online outlets from even referencing blacklisted organisations.
All ISPs are legally required to install equipment giving the OAC and KGB direct, real-time access to traffic data. The OAC sets information-security standards, manages the .by top-level domain, and can order blocking or throttling unilaterally. Reporters Without Borders designates the OAC an 'enemy of the Internet.'
The 2021 amendments to the Law on Mass Media allow the Ministry of Information to stop a media outlet's operations or block an internet resource without a court order after two warnings. January 2025 amendments to domain-registration guidelines empower national-domain administrators to cancel .by domain registrations that harm 'national interests' and add them to a new ban list.
Timeline - major decisions & events
The Operational and Analytical Center (OAC) ordered ISPs to block access to virtually all websites outside the .by domain from 25-27 January, cutting off foreign news sites and social media during the January 26 presidential vote. It was the broadest targeted blackout since the 2020 post-election shutdown.
Freedom House – Freedom on the Net 2025 ↗Authorities imposed a targeted partial block on YouTube at year-end to prevent citizens from watching exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya deliver her New Year's address, marking the first documented throttling of the platform in Belarus.
Freedom House – Freedom on the Net 2024 ↗President Lukashenko signed Law No. 109 of 24 May 2021, formally empowering the OAC to restrict or fully suspend telecommunications networks, including internet access, whenever it determines a threat to national security exists, retroactively providing a legal basis for the 2020 blackout and future shutdowns.
Official Internet Portal of the President of Belarus ↗The Ministry of Information blocked Tut.by (reaching ~40% of Belarusian internet users) citing repeated Media Law violations; simultaneous raids on its three offices resulted in the detention of editor-in-chief Maryna Zolatava and at least 14 staff members on fabricated tax-evasion charges.
Human Rights Watch ↗State-owned monopoly Beltelecom, which controls all internet gateways, imposed a near-total internet shutdown beginning on election day; mobile outages persisted intermittently through November, totalling more than 102 hours, and at least 86 websites were blocked as mass pro-democracy protests erupted.
Human Rights Watch ↗Amendments to the Law on Mass Media (adopted by Parliament on 14 June 2018) took effect, requiring every website operator to verify users' identities (via SMS or social-network login) before permitting any post, and to store that data on servers located in Belarus, effectively criminalising anonymous online expression.
ARTICLE 19 ↗The Operational and Analytical Center directed the State Inspection for Telecommunications to block access to Tor and commercial VPN/proxy services, eliminating the main circumvention tools Belarusians had relied upon to access blacklisted content.
e-Belarus.org ↗Parliament passed amendments to the 2008 Law on Mass Media allowing the Ministry of Information to block any website after issuing two warnings within 12 months, or immediately for content deemed illegal, without requiring judicial approval; liability under the law was also extended to cover user-generated comments.
Council of Europe IRIS / MERLIN Observatory ↗A law took effect requiring all commercial websites selling goods or services to Belarusian citizens to be hosted domestically under a .by domain; ISPs and Wi-Fi operators were simultaneously required to register every user by identity and to enforce government content blacklists, cementing centralised control over e-commerce and public internet access.
Freedom House – Freedom on the Net 2021 ↗The Law on Mass Media (adopted 2008) took effect on 1 February 2009, requiring both domestic and foreign-hosted websites targeting Belarusian audiences to register with the Ministry of Information and comply with content rules; the Ministry of Information was designated the primary regulator, establishing the foundational legal architecture for internet censorship in Belarus.
European Parliament Research Service ↗Belarus - other topics
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