Why does stopping MEV still require trusting a committee not to peek?
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Every production encrypted mempool protects pending transactions behind a threshold decryption committee. If enough members collude they can reconstruct keys and front-run the same transactions the protocol was built to hide. Unlike a consensus fork, early decryption by a corrupt committee leaves no on-chain evidence and cannot be slashed or even detected. A 2026 SoK paper systematising the entire field confirms this trust assumption persists across every deployed scheme. The only published alternative, DecryptChain, replaces the committee with proof-of-work, but introduces new latency tradeoffs and has not shipped on any production chain.
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Until mempool encryption eliminates the trusted committee entirely, encrypted mempools shift MEV from open searchers to whoever controls the keys, which is a smaller and harder-to-audit set of actors.
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